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I. Introduction 
 
The constitutionally protected status of speech is a familiar 
feature of our jurisprudence.1  Free speech claims are often 
upheld at the cost of significant competing public and private 
interests.  It is certainly possible to critique free speech case law 
for unjustly adjudicating these conflicts merely in one or more 
special contexts.2  The focus of this Article, however, is broader. 
 
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 
School of Law. 
1.  See, e.g., FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017) 
(providing a broad defense of much contemporary free speech law by one of its 
leading architects).  As the focus of this Article is on state action in First and 
Fourteenth Amendment free speech jurisprudence, we largely set aside 
concerns over private corporate actor restrictions on, e.g., useful access to 
internet search engines and social media sites. 
2.  See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 
(2016) (urging revisions in both directions of the coverage and stringency of 
free speech protection according to context).  See, e.g., THE PRICE WE PAY: THE 
CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura 
Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995); Brian Leiter, The Case Against Free 
Speech, 38 SYDNEY L. REV. 407 (2016) (“[T]he central question in free speech 
jurisprudence should really be how to regulate speech effectively—to minimize 
its very real harms, without undue cost to is positive values.”); Anthony 
Leaker, Against “Free Speech”, CATO UNBOUND (June 13, 2018), www.cato-
1
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This Article proposes that the constitutional status of 
freedom of speech depends on the current existence of some 
sufficient sustaining foundations in cultural beliefs and values.  
Our culture, however, has evolved in such a way as to now make 
the general constitutionally protected status of speech into, at 
best, an anachronism.  Constitutionalized freedom of speech is, 
at this point, a holdover from a time3 in which supportive 
cultural beliefs and values sufficiently underwrote our 
protective free speech jurisprudence.4  The traditional grounds 
upon which freedom of speech was constitutionally prioritized 
 
unbound.org/2018/06/13/anthony-leaker/against-free-speech (“[F]ree speech 
has been co-opted to serve anti-democratic ends; [it] has become the rallying 
point of decidedly unemancipatory political formations, invoked to attack equal 
rights, social justice, and basic norms of tolerance and inclusion . . . .”). 
3.  This formulation implies that there was some prior time in which 
cultural beliefs and values, and their institutional embodiment, better 
supported the protected constitutional status of speech.  Or, more 
metaphorically, that there was a time in which the cultural soil was more 
conducive to the healthy rootedness of freedom of speech.  It is certainly 
possible to argue, though, that there was never a time in which freedom of 
speech was well sustained by the underlying culture.  In this Article, we focus 
on the plausible claim that cultures can evolve over time in ways more, or less, 
supportive of the constitutionally protected status of speech.  This approach 
does not deny that some elements of our culture that tend to either sustain or 
undermine the status of free speech have remained constant and unchanging.  
Nor does this approach claim that cultural support for the constitutional status 
of free speech has more or less collapsed, as opposed to diminishing to a 
significant degree. 
4.  It is, however, debatable whether there has been a “steady 
deterioration over the last half century of the essential democratic norm of 
freedom of speech.”  Peter Berkowitz, Defending Democratic Norms Requires 
Defending Free Speech, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Apr. 07, 2019), 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/04/07/defending_democratic_n
orms_requires_defending_free_speech_139981.html.  See, e.g., James L. 
Gibson, Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half 
Century After McCarthyism, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96 (Jan. 2008).  See also 
Richard D. Schwartz, Stouffer: Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: 
A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind, 65 YALE L. J. 572 (1956) 
(demonstrating substantial popular opposition to meaningful freedom of 
speech.  Also reporting majority or near majority opposition to the speech 
rights of, e.g., admitted communists, atheists, and socialists); Jeremy Bauer-
Wolf, Survey: Tepid Support for Free Speech Among Students, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/01/30/survey-tepid-support-
free-speech-among-students (summarizing Speaking Freely: What Students 
Think About Expression at American Colleges, FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS IN EDUCATION (2018), https://d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/05104349/Student-Attitudes-Association-
Survey.pdf). 
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have been gradually dissipating, and no sufficient alternative 
justifying grounds have taken their place.5 
The standard justifications for constitutionalizing free 
speech have eroded and become less meaningful.  The elevated 
constitutional status of freedom of speech can no longer be 
justified by pointing to any sufficient cultural grounding for that 
status.  Cultures change over time6 in ways relevant to the 
status of freedom of speech.  In our cultural context, for example, 
it is possible that massive aggregate wealth, however 
maldistributed or unstable, has depleted the cultural values and 
beliefs needed to justify constitutional freedom of speech.7  
Collective wealth and other cultural factors can seem to insulate 
us from the consequences of various forms of public speech that 
 
5.  Of course, this is a daunting task in some respects.  Our culture has, 
at all times, manifested speech taboos; shibboleths; public and private speech 
suppression of various sorts; numbing campaigns of meme-repetition; agenda-
skewing; indignant shaming; mobbing; intimidation; exclusionism; ego-
defensive pathologies; and propagandized understandings of free speech itself.  
Some account must also be taken of the effects on our public discourse of the 
current technology-driven broadening of who can speak in some publicly 
accessible fashion.  Even if the number of U.S. monthly users of Twitter in 
particular has recently declined, there are currently at least 60 million such 
users.  See J. Clement, Twitter: Number of Monthly Active U.S. Users 2010–
2019, STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/274564/monthly-active-twitter-users-in-
the-united-states/. 
6.  Under one conventional approach, a hypothetical culture may, over 
time, exhibit various mixtures of initial barbarism, mature civilization, 
decadence and exhaustion, and ultimately a combination of self-indulgence 
and a drive toward self-extinction.  Like the mythic Sibyl at Cumae, some 
civilizations may, in a sense, wish to die.  See H.D. Cameron, The Sibyl in the 
Satyricon, 65 CLASSICAL J. 337 (1970).  See, e.g., JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN 
TO DECADENCE: 1500 TO THE PRESENT: 500 YEARS OF WESTERN CULTURAL LIFE 
(1st ed. 2001); DAVID WEIR, DECADENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2018).  
See also G.W.F. HEGEL, Author’s Preface, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox 
trans. 1952, 1969 ed.) (1821) (suggesting that only with civilizational decline 
does wisdom arrive.  Hegel did not, however, guarantee that all declining 
civilizations will have the resources necessary to recognize the causes of their 
decline).  See generally EDWARD CAIRD, HEGEL (1972) (discussing Hegel’s 
understanding of cultural vitality and development in his letter to Zeilmann 
in which Hegel views the French Revolution as leaving behind the “baby shoes” 
and “fetters” of the Ancient Regime). 
7.  See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
20TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION (1996) (discussing themes from MANCUR OLSON, 
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND 
SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982) and JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM 
AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 2008)). 
3
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increasingly reflect one sort of pathology or another.8 
Our focus is not upon economics as it affects culture but on 
several important aspects of culture insofar as they affect the 
net value of speech.  In particular, we consider first the official 
legal cultural beliefs embodied in Supreme Court opinions, as 
those beliefs have evolved over time.9  The Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence itself has already lost any clear, coherent, and 
consistent sense of what the free speech clause is to mean and to 
accomplish.10 
Given the evolving case law, we then consider the commonly 
accepted basic values thought to underlie the constitutionally 
privileged status of speech.11  The Article then points out the 
consequences, over time, of the underlying culture’s thinning out 
and minimalizing what these underlying values amount to.12  
This “thinning out” of our sense of what the free speech values 
really amount to crucially impeaches the logic of according 
specially protected constitutional status to speech at the expense 
of other values and interests.13 
These crucial effects of the changes in our cultural 
understanding of the status and meaning of the values 
underlying freedom of speech are, in turn, enhanced by a range 
of important recent cultural trends in education and other 
spheres.14  The benefits of freedom of speech have been gradually 
reduced because of these sustained cultural trends.  We then 
illustrate, through the case law, some important increasing 
cultural costs incurred when current free speech claims override 
significant conflicting values.15  A brief Conclusion then 
follows.16 
 
 
 
8.  See generally ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE 
(Routledge ed. 1992) (discussing, inter alia, what has become increasingly 
prominent public speech phenomena of denial, projection, and displacement of 
affect). 
9.  See infra Part II. 
10.  See infra Part II. 
11.  See infra Parts II, III. 
12.  See infra Parts II, III. 
13.  See infra Parts II, III. 
14.  See infra Part IV. 
15.  See infra Part V. 
16.  See infra Part VI. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/5
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II. The Court Recognizes, and Then Gradually Loses Clarity 
with Respect to, Foundational Free Speech Values 
 
The history of the Supreme Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence is complex and not susceptible to simple 
generalization.  Clearly, though, there are historic moments of 
judicial endorsement of basic speech values that resonate and, 
in a sense, persist.17  But those moments may lose their 
importance over time, particularly when the broad underlying 
culture no longer genuinely validates the basic free speech 
values in question. 
Among these classic moments of the judicial endorsement of 
underlying free speech values would be judicial assertions that 
the First Amendment should favor “free trade in ideas,”18 and 
that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”19  More 
elaborately, Justice Brandeis celebrated the values of “the 
discovery and spread of political truth,”20 deliberation rather 
than arbitrariness of government,21 and the development of 
one’s faculties,22 all through freedom of speech.23 
These themes were then pursued in later cases, such as 
Thornhill v. Alabama24 and Keyishian v. Board of Regents.25  
And it is fair to say that themes—such as the pursuit of truth, 
promoting democratic self-government, and facilitating self-
realization, as presumably promoted by constitutional freedom 
 
17.  See, e.g., THOMAS IRWIN EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION (1970); HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH IN AMERICAN (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). 
18.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
19.  Id.  See also Nat’l Inst. Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 
2361, 2375 (2018). 
20.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (discussing “the power of free and fearless 
reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and 
economic truth” as well as the role of freedom of speech in “popular 
government”). 
25.  385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (discussing classrooms as “peculiarly the 
‘marketplace of ideas’” through which “the robust exchange of ideas” may lead 
to the discovery of truth without any censorial skewing or pre-selection). 
5
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of speech—continue to arise in the Court’s ongoing free speech 
jurisprudence.  But it is also fair to say that in recent years, the 
Court’s concern for these purported basic free speech values has 
been gradually diminishing.  This latter development reflects, 
with some time lag, broad cultural shifts in the meaning, depth, 
and significance of the classic free speech values and their 
obvious assumptions and prerequisites. 
The Court’s gradually diminishing reliance on the classic 
free speech values does not imply that the Court has contracted 
the scope of free speech protection; typically, far from it.  In 
particular, the Court has come to adopt the speech of pure 
commercial transactions between sellers and buyers of 
consumer goods and services as falling within the scope and 
protection of the free speech clause.26  Purely commercial 
barroom nude dancing, undertaken for the sake of increased 
income, is also now assumed to be within the compass of freedom 
of speech.27  So is speech in the form of a deliberate lie, uttered 
merely for the sake of deceiving an audience into according 
undeserved respect to the speaker, to the effect that the speaker 
has been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.28  
Scrupulous concern for the free speech rights of traffickers in the 
video depiction of the torturous extinction of helpless animals is 
judicially observed.29  Restrictions on the sale to minors of 
especially violent video games, even when the game is held to 
lack serious relevant value,30 violate freedom of speech,31 partly 
on the grounds of the murkiness of any line between politics and 
sheer entertainment.32  Speech, whether protected or not, has 
been detected even in the professed absence of any intent to 
convey any relevant message.33 
 
26.  See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (discussing pure commercial product 
advertising). 
27.  See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563, 565–66 
(1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality). 
28.  See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727–28 (2012) (Kennedy, 
J., plurality). 
29.  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 464, 465–66 (2010). 
30.  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 789 (2011). 
31.  Id. at 791–93. 
32.  Id. at 790 (“[I]t is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment 
and dangerous to try.”). 
33.  See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (discussing a 
banner that stated “Bong Hits For Jesus” as, per Frederick himself, “just 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/5
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The point is not that any of these cases was rightly or 
wrongly decided, or that the current Court always decides free 
speech cases in the spirit of these cases.  Rather, the idea is that 
these cases, whether mistaken or not, generally do not rely on 
the logic of any of the Court’s classic expositions of the basic 
values thought to underlie the specially protected status of 
speech.  Thus, while each of the cases above may be defensible, 
it would be difficult to persuasively defend these cases by appeal 
to the values endorsed historically in the Abrams dissenting 
opinion,34 the Whitney concurring opinion,35 the Thornhill 
opinion,36 the Keyishian opinion,37 or any other such classic basic 
free speech value statement. 
This is not to suggest that the Court has begun to 
consciously reduce its reliance on the classic free speech values 
or on any metaphysically ambitious understanding of those 
values.  There are indeed instances of a reduced judicial focus on 
truth, democracy, and self-realization as underlying guides in 
free speech cases.  As the Court’s thinking comes to be influenced 
by the evolving cultural life and the elite and popular 
metaphysical assumptions of the day, the Court’s assumptions 
need not be explicitly articulated by the Court. 
Courts generally need not even be aware of, let alone 
articulate, the evolving cultural assumptions underlying their 
opinions.  Lord Keynes famously observed a cultural process of 
elite influence and its generally unrecognized character in 
declaring that even “[m]admen in authority . . . are distilling 
their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.  I 
am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated 
 
nonsense meant to attract television cameras”).  See also Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563, (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality); Burge v. 
Colton Sch. Dist. 53, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1060 (D. Or. 2015) (holding that 
protected, on free speech grounds, a student’s social media post to the effect 
that a low grade-assigning teacher “needs to be shot”).  In the broader context, 
it is apparently well-established that freedom of speech protects rude gestures 
directed toward a particular police officer.  See Cruise-Gulyas v. Minard, 918 
F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1255 (6th 
Cir. 1997)). 
34.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
35.  See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372–80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
36.  See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
37.  See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
7
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compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.”38  Similar 
largely elite-level influences, whether direct or indirect, 
undiluted or diluted, articulated or in-articulated, would affect 
Supreme Court members as well.39 
As we might expect, the Court displays ambivalence as to 
the nature of any grounds underlying the constitutional 
commitment to freedom of speech.  Consider, for example, the 
striking, if largely unacknowledged, contrast in approach 
between the direct political protest case of Cohen v. California40 
and the “seven dirty words” case of FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation.41  The two case outcomes may be compatible, but 
they clearly bespeak two distinct understandings of how culture 
informs free speech laws. 
The Cohen case thus invokes the classic Brandeis 
concurrence in Whitney,42 but then famously declares that 
 
While the particular four letter word being 
litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than 
most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often 
true that once man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.  
Indeed, we think it is largely because government 
officials cannot make principled distinctions in 
this area that the Constitution leaves matters of 
taste and style so largely to the individual.43 
 
Courts generally do not attempt to do philosophy.  So we 
should not expect the Court to announce its endorsement, in this 
respect, of any sort of underlying relativism, subjectivism, or of 
 
38.  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST, AND MONEY 383 (2018 ed.) (1938). 
39.  See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006); NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, 
THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME 
COURT (2019) (discussing elite and other cultural influences on the Supreme 
Court with an emphasis on partisan political conflict). 
40.  403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
41.  438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
42.  See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 
375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
43.  Id.  See also Brief for the Cato Inst., et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 2294 (2019) (No. 18-302), 2018 WL 
7890204 (“[T]here cannot be one consensus standard of ‘scandalous language’ 
in a heterogeneous society.”). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/5
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underlying arbitrariness.  In referring to the question as merely 
one of “taste and style,”44 the Court clearly draws upon these 
rationally modest categories.  Of taste, after all, there is 
proverbially no disputing.45  A genuine preference for the taste 
of vanilla over strawberry is hardly subject to evidence-based 
debate.  Such preferences require neither interesting 
metaphysical assumptions nor controversial foundations. 
Crucially, the Court in Cohen then apparently links the use 
of profanity with valuable emotional fervor, and reports that 
 
Much linguistic expression serves a dual 
communicative function . . . .  [W]ords are often 
chosen as much for their emotive46 as for their 
cognitive force.  We cannot sanction the view that 
the Constitution . . . has little or no regard for that 
emotive function which, practically speaking, may 
often be the more important element of the overall 
message sought to be communicated.47 
 
Whatever the contribution of emotion itself to the logic of 
constitutionally protecting speech may be,48 emotional 
expression by itself typically does not make any crucial 
assertions that can be meaningfully investigated as to their 
 
44.  Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25. 
45.  See De gustibus non est disputandum, MERRIAM WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/de%20gustibus%20non%20est%20disputandum (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2019) (“[T]here is no disputing about taste”).  See also DAVID 
SOBEL, FROM VALUING TO VALUE: A DEFENSE OF SUBJECTIVISM (1st ed. 2016) 
(providing a sophisticated approach to the subjectivity of values). 
46.  Authors have elaborated on the subject at a more formal meta-ethical 
level.  See, e.g., ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH & LOGIC (2d ed. 1952); 
CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944); J.O. URMSON, EMOTIVE 
THEORY OF ETHICS (1968); Stephen A. Satris, The Theory of Value and the Rise 
of Ethical Emotivism, 43 J. HIST. IDEAS 109 (1982).  See also Richard Joyce, 
Moral Anti-Realism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 11, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism; Mark von Roojen, Moral 
Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 28, 2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism. 
47.  Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. 
48.  See generally R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to 
Freedom of Speech, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2003) (discussing Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). 
9
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truth or falsity in any objective or grounded sense.49  Emotions 
themselves are doubtless often based on beliefs that may be true 
or false.  But the emotional expression by itself does not state 
some proposition claiming any objective grounding in the world, 
beyond the speaker’s own subjectivity. 
By contrast, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,50 the Court 
plurality adopted a significantly different approach than in 
Cohen.  One might imagine that George Carlin’s “seven dirty 
words,” as expressed in his recorded monologue in Pacifica,51 
could reasonably be thought of as vulgar, offensive, shocking, or 
not, depending upon one’s tastes and political sensibilities.  That 
would reflect the Court’s approach to Cohen.  However, the 
Court plurality in Pacifica instead peremptorily declares that “it 
is undisputed that the content of Pacifica’s [“seven dirty words”] 
broadcast was ‘vulgar,’ ‘offensive,’ and ‘shocking.’”52 
The undisputed vulgarity, offensiveness, and shockingness 
of George Carlin’s monologue might have come as a surprise to 
some of its willing listeners, if not to the defendants.  What 
should have been undisputed, under the Cohen precedent, was 
that some people, certainly, would find the monologue vulgar, 
offensive, and shocking.  Restricting speech that predictably 
offends some people but not others is a possible rule, but not a 
rule that Pacifica endorses. 
Pacifica, however, leaves unclear the real basis for declaring 
that the Carlin language is vulgar, offensive, and shocking.  
Perhaps the underlying logic is that the Carlin monologue really 
is—or else really and objectively should be judged—vulgar, 
offensive, and shocking by any reasonable person.  This 
interpretation would emphasize any possible objective grounds 
underlying such a judgment.  Or perhaps the Court instead 
recognized the sheer disputability and relativism of any such 
judgment, and then, consistent with that relativism, chose 
merely to endorse and impose its own subjectively preferred 
 
49.  One might consider an honest and sincere emotional expression to be, 
perhaps, overwrought, or otherwise inappropriate, but the Court in Cohen is 
explicitly separating emotive speech, or its supposed equivalent, emotional 
speech, from speech with cognitive content. 
50.  Compare FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion), with 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 14 (1971). 
51.  See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745–47. 
52.  Id. at 747. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/5
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view.53 
More decisively, though, it is clear that Pacifica affords less 
scope for the constitutional protection of emotive speech than 
was contemplated in Cohen.54  For the Cohen Court, the 
cognitive and emotive meanings of an expression may be 
inseparable, or of comparable importance, for free speech 
purposes.55  In contrast, the Pacifica plurality contends for the 
general separability of the message’s content from the way, 
perhaps emotional, in which that content is delivered.  Thus the 
Pacifica Court declared that “[a] requirement that indecent 
language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, 
rather than the content, of serious communication.  There are 
few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less 
offensive language.”56 
Overall, we have herein no interest in endorsing any 
particular approach to typical free speech cases.  Rather, our 
point is to highlight the increasingly uncertain relationship 
between the Court’s free speech jurisprudence and the basic 
values commonly thought to underlie that jurisprudence.  The 
meaning, import, substance, and implications of those 
underlying values seem increasingly unclear.  Immediately 
below, we briefly focus on the basic historic underlying free 
speech values themselves and begin the process of accounting 
for the Court’s increasing lack of clarity and certainty in these 
respects. 
 
III. The Traditional Free Speech Values and the Gradual 
Flattening of Their Meaning 
 
There has long been a reasonably broad consensus as to the 
most important values thought to justify according special 
 
53.  Any logical relationship between relativism and tolerance is dubious 
at best.  One’s group perspective may simply endorse imposing the group’s 
substantive perspective on other groups, with no pretense to objective 
rightness or wrongness of any stance.  See Maria Baghramian & J. Adam 
Carter, Relativism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 11, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism; Chris Gowans, Moral Relativism, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 20, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/. 
54.  See sources cited supra notes 40–43. 
55.  See Wright, supra note 48. 
56.  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 n.18. 
11
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constitutional protection to much speech.  While the basic free 
speech values list can be expanded,57 there is much agreement 
as to the roles of: (1) promoting in particular a general search for 
truth; (2) facilitating a meaningful process of democratic 
government; and (3) encouraging meaningful self-realization, 
self-actualization, or genuine autonomy. 
Probably the most striking defense of these three 
underlying values on the merits has been John Stuart Mill’s 
classic On Liberty.58  In particular, Mill’s exposition of the values 
of truth and, especially, of meaningful self-realization conveys 
the sense that some states of affairs are, whether we all agree or 
not, objectively higher or better than others.59 
The three basic free speech values have of late been 
explicitly identified by a number of American constitutional law 
writers, including: Thomas Emerson60; Frederick Schauer61; 
Mark Tushnet, Alan K. Chen, and Joseph Blocher62; Kent 
Greenawalt63; and Alexander Tsesis.64  And the values of the 
 
57.  See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (2d ed. 1988) 
(discussing the distinctive emphasis on tolerance); Vincent Blasi, The Checking 
Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977) 
(discussing the government-checking function of speech). 
58.  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 115–28 (Gertrude Himmelfarb 
ed., Penguin Group 1974) (1859). 
59.  Id. at 127–28 (discussing higher, better, and more fully developed 
characters).  See also JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 10 (George Sher ed., 
2d ed. 1863) (“It is better to be . . . Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.  
And if the fool . . . [is] of a different opinion, it is because they only know their 
own side of the question.”). 
60.  See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) (referring to “assuring individual self-fulfillment,” 
“advancing knowledge and discovering truth,” universal “participation in 
decision making,” along with balancing “healthy cleavage and necessary 
consensus,” or a “balance between stability and change”). 
61.  See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ENQUIRY (1982) (discussing arguments from pursuing truth, from promoting 
popular sovereignty, and from self-development through social 
communication). 
62.  See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN, & JOSEPH BLOCHER, 
FREE SPEECH BEYOND WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
(2017). 
63.  See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 119, 130–47 (1989) (discussing, among other values, “truth discovery,” 
“autonomy and personal development,” and “the functioning of liberal 
democracy”). 
64.  See generally Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2015) (identifying the desire “to further democratic 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/5
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pursuit of truth,65 meaningful democratic governance,66 and self-
realization and autonomy67 have been the subject of continuing 
 
institutions,” to promote “personal autonomy,” and “the advancement of 
knowledge,” while arguing for the excessive narrowness and incompleteness of 
this value enumeration). 
65.  See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of 
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 965 (1978) (denying the existence of objective 
truth); Christopher Bezemek, The Epistemic Neutrality of the Marketplace of 
Ideas: Milton, Mill, Brandeis, and Holmes on Falsehood and Freedom of 
Speech, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 159 (2015); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace 
of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1, 5 (1984) (noting the waning 
popularity of the idea of objective truth); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the 
Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 4, 25 
(1995) (stating “objective truth may (or may not) be non-existent or 
unintelligible,” but the “truth” value to be realized is not in the possible 
attainment of truth, but rather, in the “existential [and thus actually or 
potentially non-objective] value of the search itself”) (stating “reliance on the 
actual existence of truth is not necessary to support the search for truth 
rationale”); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the 
Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. REV. 231 (2017); Frederick 
Schauer, Reflections On the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 699, 724 
(1991) (“[T]he issue is often power rather than truth, and . . . the value of truth 
(or knowledge) often lies in its being instrumental to some deeper value such 
as (but not limited to) power”); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and 
Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (1987); Irene M. 
Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s 
and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J. L. & 
HUMAN. 35 (2013); Christopher C. Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 19 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 669, 672 (1986).  Beyond the legal literature, 
consider the traditionalist belief in a “desire to know” that is “independent of 
the individual’s likes and dislikes, or his wishful and anxious thinking.”  
BERNARD LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, in 
COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN 619 (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert 
M. Doran eds., 5th ed. 1992). 
66.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First 
Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2016) (“Freedom of speech does 
more than promote democracy; it also promotes a democratic culture” 
(emphasis in original)); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic 
Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression For the Information Society, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (emphasizing the possibilities for both new 
opportunities for cultural participation and new mechanisms for constricting 
and skewing such participation); Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First 
Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2016) (emphasizing Jeffersonian 
meaningful and active citizenship); Blasi, supra note 57; Robert Post, 
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011) 
(“[T]he best possible explanation of the shape of First Amendment doctrine is 
the value of democratic self-governance.”).  Professor Post also endorses the 
consensus on the three core free speech values.  See id. at 478.  See also Kate 
Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing 
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018).  
67.  See, e.g., FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 22 (2017) 
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debate. 
For our purposes, we assume that some combination of one 
or more of these traditionally cited values can—at least on some 
possible definitions and under some possible cultural 
circumstances—suffice to justify special constitutional 
protection for speech.  The problem, though, is that under our 
continually evolving cultural circumstances, the meaning and, 
crucially, the depth of meaning of the key concepts has 
significantly changed.  These changes in meaning, in general, 
have been in the direction of the thinning out, flattening, 
reduction in depth, reduction in ambition, insubstantiality, and 
even the moral trivialization of the terms in question. 
Thus the very idea of truth, most crucially, today tends not 
to mean what it once might have meant.  Similarly, the ideas of 
self-realization, of the development of one’s potential, and of 
autonomy have tended to flatten, undergo minimization, and to 
be reduced to more superficial understandings than might once 
have been the case.  Even our understandings of democratic self-
 
(emphasizing Thomas Emerson’s concern for “individual self-fulfillment” 
through freedom of speech); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON FREEDOM (2019) 
(emphasizing agency and autonomy with no distinctive reference to freedom of 
speech in particular); C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 251, 253 (2011) (discussing autonomy as “the capacity to pursue 
successfully the life she endorses—self-authorized at least in the sense that, 
no matter how her image of a meaningful life originates, she now can endorse 
that life for reasons that she now accepts”); Id. at 966 (focusing on speech that 
“fosters individual self-realization and self-determination”); Susan J. Brison, 
The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 313 (1998) (discerning and 
critiquing six distinguishable senses of the idea of autonomy); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 877–78 (1994) 
(distinguishing “descriptive” autonomy from “ascriptive” or (largely) 
normatively recognizable autonomy, or a right thereto); Stephen M. Feldman, 
Postmodern Free Expression: A Philosophical Rationale for the Digital Age, 100 
MARQUETTE L. REV. 1123 (2017) (focusing on autonomy as self-emergence 
based on “relational” autonomy); Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-
Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1998); Martin Redish, The 
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (“[T]he constitutional 
guarantee of speech ultimately serves only one true value, which I have labeled 
‘individual self-realization.’”); T.M. Scanlon, Comment on Baker’s Autonomy 
and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 319 (2011) (stating that, contrary 
to his own previous beliefs, “the concept of autonomy is not a helpful one”); 
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991) (focusing in particular on autonomy as “a 
person’s control over her own reasoning processes”).  For a broader survey, see 
John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 9, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/. 
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governance have undergone a gradual evacuation of depth and 
substantiality of meaning, due largely to the gradual attention 
and evacuation of the former meanings of truth and of self-
realization and autonomy. 
Crucially, these cultural trends have reached a point at 
which “truth,” “democracy,” and “autonomy,” as we currently 
tend to understand them, no longer suffice to appropriately 
justify a general exaltation of freedom of speech above a wide 
range of competing public and private desires, preferences, and 
interests.  Our collective culture does not, at this point,68 
adequately ground a distinctively general constitutionally 
protected status for speech.69  As our understanding of the very 
ideas70 of truth, democracy, and autonomy become increasingly 
limited, attenuated, and contested, their power to justify 
inescapably costly constitutional practices and institutions is 
inevitably reduced. 
Most fundamentally, consider the gradual erosion of the 
depth of meaning and metaphysical ambition of the idea of the 
pursuit, however fallibly and haltingly, of truth.  Where the 
understanding of truth itself as foundational was perhaps at one 
point largely taken for granted, or at least familiar, we take 
ourselves of late to be living in some sort of largely or 
increasingly “post-truth” culture.  “Post-truth” was the Oxford 
Dictionary’s word of the year in 2016.71  Of course, this popular 
usage can itself hardly explain cultural trends before its own rise 
to prominence.  And the idea of post-truth is often used in rather 
narrow, transient political contexts.72 
But the idea of a post-truth culture, whatever its precise 
import, can also draw upon more sustained underlying cultural 
 
68.  We leave aside the question of whether our then current 
understanding of the basic free speech values sufficiently justified 
constitutionalizing free speech at any point in our cultural history. 
69.  We also set aside the possibility of adequately justifying 
constitutionalized free speech by means of some logic apart from reliance on 
one or more of the consensual basic free speech values discussed later in this 
article. 
70.  Thus, our argument does not depend on any claim of increased 
prevalence of say, lying in public, as long as the dominant cultural 
understanding of the fundamental nature of lying remains unchanged. 
71.  Post-truth, OXFORD DICTIONARIES (2016), 
https://languages.oup.com/press/news/2016/12/11/WOTY-16. 
72.  As in its use in describing only particular political actors, as opposed 
to much broader and sustained cultural phenomena. 
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trends, whether at popular or elite cultural levels.73  Some 
analyses of post-truth point to the accruing influence of initially 
elite-level, but now more broadly influential, post-modernism.74  
The post-truth culture can be seen, at least in part, as the 
accruing result of the broadly postmodernist view that the very 
idea of “a right or wrong answer to what a text (whether written 
or behavioral) ‘meant’” should be interrogated, though 
presumably not for its objective truth or falsity.75  On this typical 
understanding of post-modernism, “[s]ince there is no such thing 
as ‘truth,’ anyone who claims to ‘know’ something [or, 
presumably, even to pursue the truth with humility] is really 
just trying to oppress us, not educate us.  Having power allows 
us to control what is true,76 not the other way around.”77 
By implication, if truth is largely reducible to something 
akin to power, to perspective, to any large number of disparate 
perspectives, or to indefinitely shifting perspectives not further 
accountable to anything apart from power, the idea of truth can 
hardly provide even a contribution to a convincing account of 
why freedom of speech should, despite its evident costs, be 
constitutionally enshrined.  The basic problem is that as truth’s 
linkage to the idea of any sort of objective reality is loosened or 
disavowed,78 the utility of the idea of truth in justifying broad 
freedom of speech is thereby reduced or eliminated. 
 
73.  See, e.g., MICHIKO KAKUTANI, THE DEATH OF TRUTH: NOTES ON 
FALSEHOOD IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 73 (2018) (“The postmodernist argument that 
all truths are partial (and a function of one’s perspective) led to a related 
argument that there are many legitimate ways to understand or represent an 
event.”); Id. at 167 (quoting the critic George Saunders to the effect that “[o]ur 
national language . . . had become . . . dumbed down—at once ‘aggressive, 
anxiety-provoking, maudlin, polarizing’”).  These phenomena presumably 
accrue and gain influence over decades. 
74.  See id. 
75.  LEE MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH 125 (2018). 
76.  Cf. Nemo veritatem regit, AM. PHIL. PRACS. ASS’N, https://appa.edu/ 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2019) (“Nobody governs truth”). 
77.  MCINTYRE, supra note 75, at 126. 
78.  See generally JENNIFER KAVANAUGH, NEWS IN A DIGITAL AGE: 
COMPARING THE PRESENTATION OF NEWS INFORMATION OVER TIME AND ACROSS 
MEDIA PLATFORMS (2018) (discussing the gradual shift in news reporting over 
recent decades from aspirations toward objectivity to more subjective, 
emotional, or advocacy-driven emphases); Rose McDermott, Psychological 
Underpinnings of Post-Truth in Political Beliefs, 52 POL. SCI. & POL. 218 
(2019); S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting the 
Challenge, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 137 (2017). 
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The effects introduced by a broadly construed post-
modernism thus run far deeper than merely new forms of 
censorship or restrictions on, and difficulties in acquiring and 
communicating, presumably valuable views and information.79  
But the relevant cultural trends undermining the basic values 
thought to underlie freedom of speech are much broader than 
can be ascribed to post-modernism.  As one leading philosopher 
summarized the matter, “it is fair to say that almost all the 
trends in the last generation of serious philosophy lent aid and 
comfort to the ‘anything goes’ climate . . . [and] any hope for a 
genuine vindication of knowledge and rationality went into 
retreat.”80 
As the widespread references to post-modernism in 
particular suggest, the effects of various sorts of less ambitious 
and less robust approaches to the ideas of truth, knowledge, and 
ethics have gradually extended beyond academic departments.  
As another leading philosopher observed, “[e]specially within 
the academy, but also and to some extent outside of it, the idea 
that there are ‘many equally valid ways of knowing the 
world’ . . . has taken very deep root.  In vast stretches of the 
humanities and social sciences, this sort of ‘postmodernist 
relativism’ about knowledge has achieved the status of an 
orthodoxy.”81 
Within the scope of philosophy, we find approaches to 
metaphysics, knowledge, truth, and ethics, a wide range of views 
that cannot sustainably underwrite any constitutional 
 
79.  See generally Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of 
Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 175, 175–77 (2018) (assuming the elusive 
existence of objective facts, even if as “an endangered species”); Sarah C. Haan, 
Facebook’s Alternative Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 18, 19–20 (2019) (discussing the 
fraught relationship between the major social media sites, including Facebook, 
and the aim of promoting some optimally free mechanism of communicating 
views and ideas without undue public or private distortion); Sarah C. Haan, 
The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L. J. 1 (2019).  More ambitiously, 
Professor Joseph Blocher seeks to largely bypass the difficulties posed by a 
post-truth culture by emphasizing not simply truth, or the pursuit thereof, but 
the idea of knowledge, or distinctly valuable and justified true belief.  See 
Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 132 HARV. L. REV. 3 
(2019).  Of course, both knowledge and justified true belief, however 
supplemented, inescapably depend upon some underlying continuing sense of 
truth. 
80.  SIMON BLACKBURN, TRUTH: A GUIDE 139 (2005). 
81.  PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN, FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE: AGAINST RELATIVISM AND 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 2 (2006). 
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privileging of free speech.  Among these approaches we find, in 
no particular order: various forms of moral skepticism82; moral 
relativism83; moral fictionalism84; moral anti- and quasi-
realism85; emotivism86; constructivism in ethics87 and politics88; 
certain forms of philosophical pragmatism89; and various forms 
of strict materialism90 and physicalism.91  Each of these 
currently popular approaches can be contrasted with varieties of 
moral realism and with other dimensions of realism and the 
search for objectivity.92 
 
82.  See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticism, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 17, 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral.  
83.  See, e.g., Chris Gowans, Moral Relativism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Apr. 20, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism; Richard 
Joyce, Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-
objectivity-relativism.html. 
84.  See, e.g., MARC ELI KALDERON, MORAL FICTIONALISM (2005); Richard 
Joyce, Moral Fictionalism: How to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too, in THE END 
OF MORALITY: TAKING MORAL ABOLITIONISM SERIOUSLY 150 (Richard Garner & 
Richard Joyce eds., 2019).  See also Matti Eklund, Fictionalism, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism/. 
85.  See, e.g., J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1978); 
Simon Blackburn, Anti-Realist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY (David Copp ed. 2009); Joyce, supra note 46; 
Richard Joyce, Projectivism and Quasi-Realism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/projectivism-
quasi-realism.html; von Roojen, supra note 46. 
86.  See URMSON, supra note 46; Satris, supra note 46. 
87.  See, e.g., Carla Bagnoli, Constructivism in Metaethics, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 23, 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructivism-metaethics/; David O. Brink, 
Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 17 CAN. J. PHIL. 71 (1987). 
88.  See, e.g., George Klosko, Political Constructivism in Rawl’s Political 
Liberalism, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 635 (1997). 
89.  See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1990); RICHARD RORTY & PASCAL ENGEL, WHAT’S THE 
USE OF TRUTH? (William McCuaig trans., 2007).  See also R. George Wright, 
Pragmatism and Freedom of Speech, 80 N.D. L. REV. 103 (2004). 
90.  See, e.g., William Ramsey, Eliminative Materialism, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/.  
91.  See, e.g., Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Mar. 9, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/. 
92.  See, e.g., GUY AXTELL, OBJECTIVITY (2016); DAVID O. BRINK, MORAL 
REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989); DAVID ENOCH, TAKING 
MORALITY SERIOUSLY: A DEFENSE OF ROBUST REALISM (reprint ed. 2013); 
NICHOLAS RESCHER, OBJECTIVITY: THE OBLIGATIONS OF IMPERSONAL REASON 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/5
2019 FREEDOM OF SPEECH 253 
Each of these and other popular schools of thought accept, 
at best, only a remarkably modest, attenuated role for the idea 
of truth, or the pursuit thereof.  None of these approaches 
appears to underwrite a judgment that the value of the pursuit 
of truth justifies any distinctive constitutionally protected status 
for speech in its recurring conflicts with other, often less 
metaphysically ambitious values.  Again, this is not to endorse 
or critique any of the above approaches.  The point is that none 
can explain, or otherwise vindicate, a constitutional 
commitment to speech in particular.93 
As well, popular notions of an autonomous self cannot 
justify distinctive constitutional protection for speech.  This 
conclusion flows naturally from minimizing, if not dismissing, 
any robust ambitious approach to truth or knowledge.  
Autonomy without a sufficiently robust understanding of truth 
is already disqualified as a satisfactory reason for endorsing 
constitutionalized free speech.  But the recent tendency to 
minimize the idea of a meaningful, continuing, autonomous self 
in particular also deserves brief consideration in its own right.94 
Consider, for example, Professor C. Edwin Baker’s 
description of the relevant sense of autonomy.95  Professor Baker 
suggests that 
 
[A] person’s autonomy might reasonably be 
 
(1997); RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU, MORAL REALISM: A DEFENSE (2005); Geof Sayre-
McCord, Moral Realism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 3, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/.  See also DOES ANYTHING 
REALLY MATTER?: ESSAYS ON PARFIT ON OBJECTIVITY (1st ed. 2017); Tim 
Maudlin, The Defeat of Reason, BOS. REV. (June 1, 2018), 
www.bostonreview.net/science-nature-philosophy-religion/tim-maudlin-
defeat-reason. 
93.  Professor Steven D. Smith critiques the short-sightedness of attempts 
to ground a convincing, effective, motivating approach to valuing freedom of 
speech on skeptical or relativist grounds.  Professor Smith also doubts the 
suitability of skeptical or minimalist approaches to any autonomous self in 
validating autonomy and self-realization as core free speech values. See Steven 
D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 
60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 653, 677–78 (1987). 
94.  We assume that a democratic self-governance justification for free 
speech will likely depend on a sufficiently meaningful understanding of truth 
and of autonomy, and will thus rise or fall with those lines of justifying free 
speech. 
95.  See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 
251, 253 (2011). 
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conceived as her capacity to pursue successfully 
the life she endorses—self-authored at least in the 
sense that no matter how her image of a 
meaningful life originates, she can endorse that 
life for reasons she now accepts.96 
 
This is a mainstream understanding of what autonomy, in the 
relevant sense, amounts to.97  But on standard interpretations, 
it can hardly underwrite distinctive constitutional protection for 
speech. 
Classically, one might well have asked also about the nature 
of the process by which the person in question initially arrived 
at, now endorses, and currently approves of her own continuing 
endorsement of her successfully pursued life goals.  Professor 
Baker sets aside questions as to how the person’s life goals were 
initially generated.98  His focus is instead on the person’s mere 
current endorsement of the person’s beliefs,99 however acquired, 
and of the person’s motivating reasons.100  The problem is that 
just as one’s initial inclinations to pursue one goal or another 
may have been mechanically, or coercively, caused, so certainly 
may be one’s current endorsement of those inclinations.101  Such 
 
96.  Id. 
97.  See, e.g., SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE 
PATERNALISM (2013); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
AUTONOMY (1988); JASON HANNA, IN OUR BEST INTEREST: A DEFENSE OF 
PATERNALISM (2018); ANDREW SNEDDON, AUTONOMY (2013); THE INNER 
CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY (Christine Schultz ed., 2014) 
(1989); Marina Oshana, How Much Should We Value Autonomy?, in AUTONOMY 
99 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2003); R.S. Downie & Elizabeth Telfer, 
Autonomy, 46 J. ROYAL INST. PHIL. 293 (1971); Robert Young, Autonomy and 
the “Inner Self”, 17 AM. PHIL. Q. 35 (1980). 
98.  See Baker, supra note 95, at 253. 
99.  See id. 
100.  See id. 
101.  See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 90–91.  See also FRANCIS CRICK, 
THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE SOUL 3 (First 
Touchstone ed. 1995); Joshua D. Greene, Social Neuroscience and the Soul’s 
Last Stand, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE 
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SOCIAL MIND 263 (Alexander Todorov et al. eds., 2011); 
Anthony R. Cashmore, The Lucretian Swerve: The Biological Basis of Human 
Behavior and the Criminal Justice System, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4999 
(Mar. 9, 2010); Carol Hoefer, Causal Determinism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/ 
(discussing the deterministic events, randomness, and sheer luck).  See 
generally ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (2016 ed.) (discussing the implication 
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coercion can hardly be generally compatible with meaningful 
autonomy. 
In the alternative, consider a process of belief formation and 
endorsement that is entirely reducible to the mere interactions 
of waves and particles, on whatever scale; or, more concretely, 
one might think of controlling the person’s “endorsement” via, 
say, non-consensual brain implants, hostile socialization, 
surreptitious drugging, behavioral conditioning, or any other 
form of coercive influence, all of which would be incompatible 
with standard views of meaningful autonomy.102  Even if one 
wished to think of autonomy as somehow compatible with 
typical forms of coercion, attempting to bring coercion in general 
into play at the very foundation of constitutional freedom of 
speech simply does not seem plausible. 
Professor Baker’s account does, however, specify that the 
subject’s endorsement has been based on acceptable reasons.103  
The problem here is that the very idea of a human’s actions being 
genuinely motivated, or effectively caused, by anything as 
abstract and ethereal as a reason is of currently diminished 
appeal.104  If, as we have increasingly come to believe, everything 
is or can be reduced to the realm of the physical,105 the place for 
causally effective reasons, as normally understood, becomes 
dubious.  Whatever the idea of “a person’s control over her own 
reasoning processes”106 is intended to mean, any such control is 
increasingly thought to be either impossible, or else not so 
distinctive as to validate a constitutional right to freedom of 
speech.107 
 
of coercion for autonomy); NOMOS XIV: COERCION (J. Roland Pennock & Alan 
W. Chapman eds., 1972); Scott Anderson, Coercion, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Oct. 27, 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/. 
102.  See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 101; NOMOS XIV: COERCION, supra 
note 101; Anderson, supra note 101.  
103.  See Baker, supra note 95. 
104.  See, e.g., CONTEMPORARY MATERIALISM: A READER (Paul K. Moser & 
J.D. Trout eds., 1995); J. J. C. Smart, Materialism, 60 J. PHIL. 651 (1963). 
105.  See Baker, supra note 95. 
106.  David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of 
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991) (discussing an extended series 
of causal events, encompassing merely randomly probabilistic events, that 
happens to involve or terminate in brain processes does not seem to generate 
a normatively decisive distinction between autonomy and non-autonomy). 
107.  Part of the problem is that we tend increasingly to reject the 
essential metaphysics of classical Kantian autonomy, while attempting to 
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This particular free speech value is often stated, however, 
not in terms of autonomy, but in terms of something like self-
realization, self-fulfillment, self-development, self-perfection, or 
self-actualization.108  These conceptions do not bypass the 
fundamental problem of a diminishing cultural belief in the sort 
of metaphysical freedom ultimately required for a sufficient 
justification for constitutional freedom of speech.  Briefly put, if 
we are somehow reducible to anything like atoms and the void,109 
sacrificing less ambitious values, such as sensory pleasure, for 
the sake of an illusory sense of metaphysical freedom will 
ultimately have minimal appeal. 
But even if the problems that any combination of inevitable 
causal chains and sheer randomness pose for sufficiently 
meaningful freedom can be set aside, there remains the fact that 
both autonomy and self-realization (and a variety of synonyms) 
have undergone a process of cultural flattening akin to what we 
have recognized in ethical thinking more generally.110  
Autonomy and self-realization can certainly be taken in thin, 
minimalist senses111 requiring little in the way of 
metaphysics.112  The problem, though, is that to the extent that 
 
retain its persuasive force and appeal.  See Susan J. Brison, The Autonomy 
Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 312, 323 (1998).  Kantian autonomy 
classically requires robust notions of reason, dignity, and freedom of the will 
independent of any physical or biological causes.  See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, 
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 114–16 (H.J. Paton trans., 
Harper ed. 1964).  See also THOMAS E. HILL JR., AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 
29 (1991); CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 25 
(1996). 
108.  See sources cited supra note 67. 
109.  See Baker, supra note 95.  Another historically popular view, 
compatibilism, has long attempted to square universal causal determinism and 
randomness with some sort of meaningful freedom of the will.  See, e.g., 
Michael McKenna, Compatibilism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 25, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/.  See John Perry, Wretched 
Subterfuge: A Defense of the Compatibilism of Freedom and Natural Causation, 
84 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N 93 (2010) (borrowing his title from 
Immanuel Kant’s less favorable assessment of the compatibilist project), for an 
attempt at reconciling causal forces with sufficiently meaningful freedom of 
the will. 
110.  See sources cited supra notes 82–94. 
111.  See sources cited supra notes 92–98. 
112.  By contrast, consider the robust metaphysical objectivism of Plato 
and Aristotle’s understanding of the development of human potential to a 
genuinely higher and better, and not merely preferred, state.  See, e.g., 
Christopher V. Mirus, The Metaphysical Roots of Aristotle’s Teleology, 57 REV. 
METAPHYSICS 699 (2004); John M. Rist, Some Aspects of Aristotelian Teleology, 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/5
2019 FREEDOM OF SPEECH 257 
we now tend to reduce self-realization to some forms of personal 
preferences, perhaps endorsed across time,113 the idea of self-
realization either frequently conflicts with the constitutional 
status of free speech114 or is insufficient to justify the costs that 
freedom of speech must inevitably impose in terms of other 
values.115  Freedom of speech may promote the fulfillment, for 
example, of some sustained preferences.  But why presume that 
those preferences are themselves really preferable to any 
equally steady or intensely endorsed preferences with which 
freedom of speech conflicts?  Sustained, intense, and widespread 
preferences are likely to appear on both sides of a free speech 
case.  And typically enough, free speech cases pit majority 
regulatory preferences against numerical minority speaker 
preferences. 
 
IV. The Worth of Freedom of Speech as Dependent Upon Its 
Broader Cultural Context 
 
It may be possible to think of constitutional freedom of 
speech as a good thing, including its basic free speech values, 
apart from its consequences.116  Perhaps one could say that 
living under freedom of speech confers a kind of dignity on 
everyone, regardless of any effects thereof on the pursuit of 
truth, democracy, or self-realization.  But it is difficult to see any 
such universal bestowal of meaningful dignity as independent of 
the contemporary culture.  Depending upon the current state of 
cultural development, any such effect of free speech on dignity 
 
96 TRANSACTIONS & PROC. AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS’N 337 (1965). 
113.  See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 97–98. 
114.  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for 
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 
(1982); Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist 
Speech On Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431 (1990); Mari Matsuda, Public 
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2320 (1989). 
115.  See R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional 
Values: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
527 (2006), for discussion in one important context.  Of course, values such as 
equality or dignity may ultimately require a metaphysically ambitious defense 
as well.  But the costs of free speech may also be felt in terms of sheer pain and 
suffering not requiring any controversial metaphysical assumptions, for 
example. 
116.  See generally Greenawalt, supra note 63. 
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may be either enhanced or minimized.  It may, by analogy, be 
dignity-enhancing to have access to a comprehensive library, but 
less so, or even dignity-impairing, if we have been made only 
minimally capable of any meaningful use of that library.117 
In any event, it is clear that the worth of constitutional free 
speech in promoting the pursuit of truth, effective democratic 
processes, and meaningful self-realization depends upon the 
plainly variable character of the underlying culture.  A culture 
that places reduced emphasis on the pursuit of actual knowledge 
and truth, or on informed political dialogue and debate on the 
merits of issues, or on one’s own genuine personal deficiencies, 
excesses, and attempts at self-realization or perfection, is 
unlikely to benefit optimally from freedom of speech. 
It would not be difficult for an outside observer to conclude 
that our broader culture has relevantly improved over time in 
some respects, while measurably regressing in others.  We now 
have widely, if not entirely freely, available databases affording 
instantaneous access to detailed elements of most world 
cultures.118  But there can be no immediate inference from 
internet and social media use to greater relevant knowledge, 
enhanced democratic functioning, or to enhanced autonomy and 
meaningful self-realization. 
Thus, even if internet use, social media time, e-books, and 
magazines are factored in, there is clear evidence of cultural 
trends non-conducive to realizing, or even concern for, the three 
basic free speech values.  The point is partly that key socio-
cultural indicators are not high enough, but also that those 
indicators have generally been trending down over the past 
several generations.  In these respects, the cultural soil in which 
the constitutional institution of free speech is planted has 
become less effective in producing the classically anticipated 
 
117.  Or, more narrowly, consider a potentially dignity-conferring single 
book, written in a language we chose never to learn. 
118.  Google processes more than 60 thousand search queries per second, 
or 2 trillion such queries per year.  Danny Sullivan, Google Now Handles at 
Least 2 Trillion Searches Per Year, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, (May 24, 2016, 12:00 
PM), https://searchengineland.com/google-now-handles-2-999-trillion-
searches-per-year-250247.  We here set aside any possible issues of conscious 
or unconscious bias of any content provider, in any respect, that might impair 
realizing the three basic free speech values, given the difficulty of comparing 
media biases before and after the internet and social media technology 
revolutions. 
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benefits of freedom of speech. 
First, consider the phenomenon of meaningful literacy.  
Whether reading via screens is equally valuable as the reading 
of classic texts or not,119 there is evidence that reading of the sort 
that infuses distinctive value and meaning into free speech 
protection has been declining in our culture over time.120  It is 
suggested instead that “the long march to secondary orality 
seems well underway.”121  Thus, the reported gradual decline of 
reading scores,122 and perhaps not coincidentally, in relevant 
vocabulary, has occurred.123  Recent measures of basic 
competence as well in crucial subjects including history and 
 
119.  See, e.g., NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS 
DOING TO OUR BRAINS (2010) (discussing doubts about the value of reading via 
screens); Gian Paolo Barbetta et al., Let’s Tweet Again? The Impact of Social 
Networks on Literature Achievement in High School Students: Evidence from a 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 81 WORKING PAPER SERIES 2 (May 2019), 
https://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def081.pdf; Nicholas Carr, Is 
Google Making Us Stupid?, THE ATLANTIC, (July/Aug. 2008), 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-making-us-
stupid/306868 (discussing effects on the ability to concentrate for sustained 
periods). 
120.  See Steven Johnson, The Fall, and Rise, of Reading, 65 CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. 14–15 (Apr. 26, 2019) (documenting not just low levels of high 
school, college, and graduate-level educated student reading, but significant 
decreases over recent decades, including a 13% decrease in prose literacy 
among the graduate school-level students surveyed). 
121.  Caleb Crain, Why We Don’t Read, Revisited, NEW YORKER (June 14, 
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/why-we-dont-
read-revisited. 
122.  See, e.g., Erica L. Meltzer, The Death of the Lecture and the Decline 
of Reading Scores, CRITICAL READER (June 30, 2018), 
https://thecriticalreader.com/the-death-of-the-lecture-and-the-decline-of-
reading-scores/. 
123.  See, e.g., E. D. Hirsch Jr., Vocabulary Declines, with Unspeakable 
Results, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444165804578010394278688
454.  See also E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Reading Comprehension Requires Knowledge—
Of Words and the World: Scientific Insights Into the Fourth-Grade Slump and 
the Nation’s Stagnant Comprehension Scores, 27 AM. EDUCATOR 10, 21 (2003) 
(discussing the degree of literacy as dependent upon vocabulary and, 
fundamentally, upon knowledge of the world).  On a number of measures, 
though, it appears that reading scores have been flat, rather than gradually 
declining, over recent decades.  See, e.g., Natalie Wexler, Why American 
Students Haven’t Gotten Better at Reading in 20 Years, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 13, 
2018), www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/04/american-students-
reading/557915. 
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elementary civics,124 elementary science methods and results,125 
practical arithmetic and mathematics,126 basic positive 
 
124.  See, e.g., Americans Are Poorly Informed About Basic Constitutional 
Provisions, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-are-poorly-informed-
about-basic-constitutional-provisions/ (stating that 26% can name the three 
federal government branches, as opposed to 38% as recently as 2011); Allan C. 
Brownfield, The Danger Ignorance of History Poses to the Future of a Free 
Society, AM. COUNCIL TR. ALUMNI (Apr. 22, 2018), 
https://www.goacta.org/news/the-danger-ignorance-of-history-poses-to-the-
future-of-a-free-society (stating 26% of surveyed millennials as unable to 
identify Auschwitz); Edward Luce, U.S. Declining Interest in History Presents 
Risk to Democracy, FIN. TIMES (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/e19d957c-6ca3-11e9-80c7-60ee53e6681d; WW 
Finds Most Americans Can’t Pass Citizenship Test, WOODROW WILSON NAT’L 
FELLOWSHIP FOUND. (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://woodrow.org/news/perspectives/ww-finds-most-americans-cant-pass-
citizenship-test; Failing Our Students, Failing America (2007), 
www.americancivicliteracy.org/2007/summary_summary.html.  Again, 
reports of gradual decline may be difficult to disentangle from reports of 
stagnation at apparently low levels. 
125.  See, e.g., Clifford N. Lazarus, The Dangers of Scientific Illiteracy, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Apr. 28, 2007), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/think-well/201704/the-dangers-
scientific-illiteracy (noting the frequency of scientific illiteracy even among 
politicians and other elites); ‘Science Ignorance Is Pervasive in Our Society’: 
Poll Finds Majority of Americans Question Big Bang Theory, CBS DC (Apr. 22, 
2014, 8:17 AM), https://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/04/22/science-ignorance-
is-pervasive-in-our-society-poll-finds-majority-of-americans-question-big-
bang-theory/; Survey Reveals Public Ignorance of Science, NEW SCIENTIST (July 
15, 1989), www.newscientist.com/article/mg12316731-200-survey-reveals-
public-ignorance-of-science (surveying 2,000 Americans as well as 2,000 
Britons and finding that “[f]orty-three percent of Americans know that 
electrons are smaller than atoms” and almost half of Americans surveyed 
“know that it takes the Earth a year to orbit the Sun”).  It should be 
emphasized that the problem of public and elite-level scientific ignorance, 
especially across a broad range of issues, is not confined to any particular 
segment of the political spectrum.  See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Public Ignorance and 
GMO Foods, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 28, 2017, 3:16 PM), 
https://reason.com/2017/12/28/public-ignorance-and-GMO-foods.  See also 
Katharine Mangu-Ward, 80 Percent of Americans Want to Label Food That 
Contains DNA, REASON (May 24, 2016, 3:25 PM), 
https://reason.com/2016/05/24/80-percent-of-americans-want-to-label-fo/. 
126.  See, e.g., JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL 
ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (First Paperback ed. 2001) (1988) 
(discussing otherwise well-educated citizens).  Anecdotally, one notes the 
marketplace failure of the A&W Third Pounder Burger, priced the same as and 
otherwise equaling the classic Quarter Pounder, precisely because more than 
half of those surveyed believed that a third of a pound is less than a quarter of 
a pound, given that three is indeed less than four.  This is presumably a 
question in which the respondents were directly invested, as distinct from some 
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economics,127 and world religions128 have been less than 
encouraging. 
This is not to suggest that a modestly educated public 
cannot benefit from constitutionalizing freedom of speech.  Free 
speech may well tend in some respects to facilitate, for example, 
the collective search for truth, even if most of the public happens 
to be deficiently educated.  But as underlying educational 
levels129 slowly decline or stagnate disappointingly, the risks and 
costs of prioritizing speech rights over other significant interests 
inevitably tend to increase.130 
This is not to deny that much basic ignorance, especially in 
a high wealth society with an intensive division of labor, is 
entirely rational from the standpoint of any given individual.131  
Most simply, if one’s own vote, however well-informed, is 
unlikely to tip a given election, one’s rational course in 
 
remote, abstract public policy issue.  See Stacy Conradt, Why No One Wanted 
A&W’s Third-Pound Burger, MENTAL FLOSS (Feb. 26, 2016), 
http://mentalfloss.com/article/76144/why-no-one-wanted-aws-third-pound-
burger. 
127.  See, e.g., Bryan Caplan, Straight Talk about Economic Illiteracy, 
MERCATUS CTR., GEORGE MASON U. (July 2004), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Straight-Talk-about-Economic-
Illiteracy.pdf (noting the intuitiveness of economically illiterate beliefs, and the 
anti-intuitiveness of even some of the most basic positive economic insights).  
For an interesting response to Caplan’s discussion, see Jeffrey Friedman, 
Irrationality, or Just Plain Ignorance?, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 14, 2006), 
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/11/14/jeffrey-friedman/irrationality-or-
just-plain-ignorance.  Consider also that in a self-indulgent and high wealth 
culture, it is often simply more gratifying to think of economics in normative 
terms than in positive or cumulative evidentiary terms.  A focus on the 
normative may relieve any pressures toward numeracy.  
128.  See, e.g., STEPHEN PROTHERO, RELIGIOUS LITERACY: WHAT EVERY 
AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW—AND DOESN’T (EPub ed. 2007); U.S. Religious 
Knowledge Survey, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 28, 2010), 
www.pewforum.org/2010/09/28/u-s-religious-knowledge-survey. 
129.  See generally RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA ROKSA, ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT: 
LIMITED LEARNING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES (2011); Philip Babcock & Mindy 
Marks, Leisure College, USA: The Decline in Student Study Time, AM. 
ENTERPRISE INST. (Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.aei.org/research-
products/report/leisure-college-usa/ (discussing the exceptionally broad and 
significant decreases among all groups in college study time as consistently 
developing over the past multiple decades). 
130.  See PATRICIA ROBERTS-MILLER, DEMAGOGUERY AND DEMOCRACY 
(2017). 
131.  See, e.g., ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY 
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2d ed. 2016) (discussing rational voter 
ignorance of politics and economics). 
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nonetheless voting may well be merely to think well of oneself, 
or to attempt to ingratiate oneself with some group with which 
one identifies, or from which one seeks approval.  Even if one 
does not publicize how one voted or intends to vote, the personal 
payoff from thereby associating oneself with a preferred group 
may outweigh the costs of voting, let alone the costs of voting on 
the basis of any reasonable assessment of one’s own biases and 
limitations.132 
Finally, the importance of levels of the public’s competence 
in general does not lessen the distinctive importance of 
competency levels among cultural elites.  It is subject to doubt 
whether our contemporary elites tend to display the intellect, 
interactive style, priorities, and the character and public virtues 
necessary to meaningfully promote the broader cultural 
practices of truth seeking, democratic dialogue, and genuine 
self-fulfillment via free speech.133  One dimension of this problem 
may be the degree to which both elites and non-elites tend to 
 
132.  See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).  See also 
EPIC-SUMMARY, SUMMARY: THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2019) (summarizing 
Daniel Kahneman’s book).  Alternatively, one could think of one’s chosen 
political antagonists as less nuanced and less cognitively complex than one’s 
chosen allies.  See Lucian Gideon Conway III et al., Are Conservatives Really 
More Simple-Minded than Liberals? The Domain Specificity of Complex 
Thinking, 37 POL. PSYCHOL. 1 (2015); John T. Jost, Ideological Asymmetries 
and the Essence of Political Psychology, 38 POL. PSYCHOL. 167 (2017); Joris 
Lammers et al., The Political Domain Appears Simpler to the Politically 
Extreme Than to Political Moderates, 8 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 612 
(2017).  Nor is politics a realm in which one’s mistaken judgments are likely to 
be fully recognized in their frequency and full weight.  See DAVID DUNNING, 
SELF-INSIGHT: ROADBLOCKS AND DETOURS ON THE PATH TO KNOWING THYSELF 
(2012); PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW 
CAN WE KNOW? (2005).  
133.  See, e.g., CHRIS HAYES, TWILIGHT OF THE ELITES: AMERICA AFTER 
MERITOCRACY (2012); TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE: THE CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT MATTERS (2017); TETLOCK, 
supra note 132; Conor Friedersdorf, How Stigma Sows the Seeds of Its Own 
Defeat, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/how-stigma-sows-seeds-
of-its-own-defeat/509273/ (observing that “only 19 percent of millennials agree 
that it would be illegitimate for the military to take control of the government,” 
and in general, that “[i]n the Western world, the percentage of people who say 
that is essential to live in a democracy is in precipitous decline”); Lawrence R. 
Jacobs, The Cluelessness of the Elites, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2019), 
http://www.startribune.com/the-cluelessness-of-the-elites/506905552/.  These 
sources variously emphasize perceived inadequacies of contemporary elites, 
the inadequacies of non-elites in failing to appropriately respect elite expertise, 
or some pathology flowing from elite/non-elite interaction. 
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avoid any meaningful reassessment of their views and 
judgments in the face of apparently important, and particularly 
adverse, new information.134  The classic study of largely 
unrevised basic beliefs in the face of apparent disconfirmation, 
When Prophecy Fails,135 focused on a fringe UFO cult’s 
predictions of the end of the world.136  Today’s version of this 
phenomenon of remarkably refractory persistence of belief in the 
face of counter evidence is much broader.  We cling to beliefs 
despite increasingly prominent counter-evidence.137  A 
reasonable sense of fallibility is often replaced by what amounts 
to a remarkable imperviousness to evidence. 
Under these contemporary circumstances, the realistic 
value of traditional free speech doctrines is gradually 
diminished. 
 
V. Some Competing Value Costs of Free Speech Under 
Contemporary Cultural Conditions 
 
One important dimension of our free speech problem is that 
evolving cultural conditions have reduced the usefulness of free 
speech in promoting the search for truth, meaningful democracy, 
and autonomy or self-realization in any meaningful sense.138  
This amounts to the reduced value side of the problem.  Some 
attention should be paid as well to the increasing cultural cost139 
 
134.  See TETLOCK, supra note 132. 
135.  See LEON FESTINGER, HENRY RIECKEN, & STANLEY SCHACHTER, WHEN 
PROPHECY FAILS (Reprint ed. 2009) (1956). 
136.  See id. 
137.  One common reaction, beyond denial or some other classical defense 
mechanism, seems to involve not publicly resurrecting the apparently 
discredited belief until some time has passed, or until the context has somehow 
changed.  See FREUD, supra note 8.  Apparently, refuted beliefs often go into a 
sort of dormant or latent phase. 
138.  See infra Parts III, IV.  It is also possible that the current costs of 
restrictions on speech are mitigated by an increasing variety of protective 
techniques in communicating, collectively referred to as esoteric writing.  See 
ARTHUR M. MELZER, PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN THE LINES: THE LOST HISTORY OF 
ESOTERIC WRITING (2014); Paul J. Bagley, On the Practice of Esotericism, 53 J. 
HIST. IDEAS 231 (1992). 
139.  The term “cultural cost” is used here to distinguish social costs of 
the content or message of speech, or of the sheer inescapability of speech in 
public or private spaces, from reduced costs of speech in terms of, say, 
increased low-cost access via social media to a potentially broad audience for 
one’s messages.  See sources cited supra notes 67, 122. 
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dimension of the free speech problem.  It is easier, however, to 
classify the purported benefits of free speech140 than it is to 
similarly categorize its cultural costs.141 
Thus, no useful inventory of all of the increasing cultural 
costs of freedom of speech is realistically possible.  We can, 
however, take samplings of some of the social costs of free speech 
in selected contexts.  Below, we briefly consider, in turn, the 
increased cultural significance of college campus hate speech142; 
of group-disparaging speech by lower-level public school 
students143; and of the group-disparagement potential of 
registered trademarks.144 
As a matter of sheer numbers, the cultural costs of 
university campus hate speech, whether legally protected or not, 
must necessarily have increased over the past several decades.  
This is largely a matter of simple arithmetic.  After all, the 
visible presence of many of the now typical hate speech victims 
was modest in the decades of the 1950’s and 1960’s.145  In 
particular, “[p]rior to the late 1960[‘]s most of the nation’s 
highest-ranked colleges and universities enrolled token 
numbers of black students.  In some cases, there were no 
African-American students on the campuses of our most highly 
regarded institutions.”146  More broadly, from 1976 to 2008, 
Hispanic college enrollment rose six-fold,147 while black student 
enrollment rose from 943,000 to 2,269,000.148  The percentages 
 
140.  Under our conventional free speech value headings.  See infra Part 
II. 
141.  To a degree, however, some of the cultural costs of free speech could 
be formulated in terms of losses of autonomy or of self-realization.  See sources 
cited supra note 114 (discussing some effects of hate speech). 
142.  See infra notes 151–160 and accompanying text. 
143.  See infra notes 161–172 and accompanying text.  
144.  See infra notes 173–181 and accompanying text. These cultural costs 
turn on the message of speech in question.  Some of the increasing cultural 
costs of free speech, however, may reflect the sheer inescapability of speech in 
public places, rather than the content of any speech.  See R. George Wright, 
Public Fora and the Problem of Too Much Speech, 106 KY. L. J. 409 (2016). 
145.  See JBHE Foundation, Inc., Long-Term Black Student Enrollment 
Trends at the Nation’s Highest-Ranked Colleges and Universities, 8 J. BLACKS 
HIGHER EDUC. 10, 10 (1996); Susan Aud et al., Status and Trends in the 
Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. EDUC. 
STAT. (July 2010).  
146.  JBHE Foundation, Inc., supra note 145, at 12. 
147.  Susan Aud et al., supra note 145, at 122. 
148.  Id. 
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of women college students also increased over the same 
period.149 
Doubtless, the basic free speech values have been, in some 
respects, variously furthered by these very trends.  But our focus 
here on the cultural costs of free speech constitutionalization150 
requires that we take account also of the costs of identity-based 
assaultive speech on campus.  Consider, concretely, university 
campus-based incidents of the sort more generally described by 
Professor Richard Delgado: 
 
[F]ace-to-face vituperation can pollute the 
environment in ways almost as damaging as 
billboards and monuments.  A minority group 
member who is the target of a racial name hurled 
out of the blue is apt to review it in his mind many 
times.  He or she may recount it to friends and 
family, who may, in turn, tell others . . . .151 
 
These sorts of harms may be largely intangible, but they 
adversely implicate the free speech value of self-realization of 
the target or victim, in multiple ways.152  Nor are the harms of 
personal insults and epithets typically reducible through what 
classical free speech theory refers to as “more speech,” or 
counterspeech.153  Indeed, we might well conclude that in typical 
cases, attempting to rebut intentionally degrading and 
scurrilous speech on the merits, as though in some sort of good 
faith mutual inquiry into the truth, would itself be objectively 
humiliating.154 
 
149.  Id. 
150.  We here set aside distinctions between federal and state 
constitutional free speech law, federal statutory and regulatory protection of 
free speech, and the state action requirement for violation of the First 
Amendment.  See R. George Wright, Campus Speech and the Functions of the 
University, 43 J. C. & U. L. 1 (2017), for further discussion. 
151.  Richard Delgado, Book Review, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 232, 233 (2012) 
(reviewing Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1596 (2010)). 
152.  See sources cited supra note 114. 
153.  See sources cited supra notes 20–23.  Note that these types of harms 
of campus hate speech are not spread evenly across members of dominant and 
traditionally subordinated groups. 
154.  This may be true even if one assumes that the presumed audience 
for such a rebuttal is still available.  See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD 
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Some similar costs of contemporary free speech law arise in 
public school student speech cases, with the addition of 
distinctive costs to the multiple socializing functions of the 
public schools.155  The eventually mooted case of Harper v. 
Poway Unified School District considered whether a public high 
school may “prohibit students from wearing t-shirts with 
messages that condemn and denigrate other students based on 
their sexual orientation[.]”156  The court recognized that public 
schools have a number of commonly recognized purposes, any 
one of which could potentially conflict with broadly protected 
student speech rights.157 
In particular, the court recognized the possibility of 
persistent psychological injury stemming from even non-
confrontational condemnation “on the basis of a core identifying 
characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual 
orientation . . . .”158  One might well think of such injuries not 
only in terms of privacy,159 security,160 and equal educational 
opportunity,161 but as well, ironically, in terms of the basic free 
speech value of individual autonomy and self-realization,162 to 
the extent to which we still wish to take the ideas of autonomy 
and self-realization seriously.  In general, the costs of 
recognizing “freedom for the thought that we hate”163 are not 
equivalent to freedom for the thought that foreseeably wounds 
or impairs at a fundamental personal and emotional level.164 
 
GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS (2017); NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE 
SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP (2018); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, SPEAK FREELY: WHY UNIVERSITIES MUST DEFEND FREE SPEECH 
(2018); Andrew Altman, Liberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A Philosophical 
Examination, 103 ETHICS 302 (1993). 
155.  See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 
2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007); R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 
10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1 (2014) (noting the variable and multidimensional role 
of the public schools in basic education, teaching tolerance, equality, and 
mutual respect in political matters). 
156.  See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th 
Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007). 
157.  See id. at 1176. 
158.  Id. at 1178. 
159.  See id. 
160.  See id. 
161.  See id. 
162.  See generally sources cited supra notes 93–116. 
163.  United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929). 
164.  See Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178–79.  The effects of an abstractly 
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Consider, as well, the cultural costs of registering 
trademarks that disparage particular groups through 
recognizable slurs and epithets.165  Part of the problem in fully 
recognizing the cultural costs of officially registering such 
trademarks may lie in the earnest desire of some trademark 
applicants to re-appropriate, or to drain the pejorative 
associations of, the typically disparaging slur or epithet in 
question.166  However laudable, or effective, such intentions may 
conceivably be, they do not present the same problems of 
cultural cost as unequivocally disparaging trademarks. 
It is possible that market forces, if not simple decency, will 
tend to suppress the desire to register a group-disparaging 
trademark, or at least to reduce the value of such a mark.167  Our 
concern, however, is with trends in the cultural costs of group-
disparaging marks.  Of late, even national-level sellers of goods 
and services have tended to reject the traditional strategy168 of 
seeking to broaden their market by avoiding political offense.169  
 
expressed ideological statement, and of direct disparagement based on core 
personal identity, thus need not be the same. 
165.  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(a) to address trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into 
contempt, or disrepute” any person). See also Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 
879 F.3d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing id.); In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) in the context of a different 
trademark provision addressing “immoral” or “scandalous” matter), aff’d sub 
nom. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2019). See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, 
Free Speech Challenges to Trademark Law After Matal v. Tam, 56 HOUS. L. 
REV. 401 (2018). 
166.  See generally Matal, 137 S. Ct 1744; Wandering Dago, Inc., 879 F.3d 
20. 
167.  See generally R. George Wright, Political Discrimination by Private 
Employers, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 761 (2018). 
168.  As legendarily articulated by Michael Jordan, to the effect that 
Republicans buy sneakers too.  But see Giri Nathan, Did Michael Jordan Ever 
Say “Republicans Buy Sneakers, Too”?, DEADSPIN (Jul. 26, 2016, 2:02 PM) 
https://deadspin.com/did-michael-jordan-ever-say-republicans-buy-sneakers-
1784530317. 
169.  See, e.g., Martin Armstrong, America’s Most Polarizing Brands, 
STATISTA (Oct. 25, 2017), www.statista.com/chart/11601/america’s-most-
polarizing; How Americans View the Politics of Brands, AXIOS (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.axios.com/political-polarization-business-politics-brands-
f7b78ed9-693f-4106-8895-4c8409859f8b.html; Oliver McAteer, How Brands 
Can Benefit From Polarization, CAMPAIGN US (Sept. 21, 2018), 
www.campaignlive.com/article/brands-benefit-polarization/1493443; Patricia 
Nakache, Polarization Is an Opportunity For Mission-Driven Brands, FAST CO. 
(Nov. 7, 2018), www.fastcompany.com/90264170/polarization-is-an-
opportunity; Nailya Ordabayeva, How Liberals and Conservatives Shop 
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Corporations are now often willing to risk, if not invite, the 
alienation of some potential customers for the sake of a better 
image with, and greater loyalty from, other sometimes 
demographically targeted customers.170 
In light of this trend, consider the case of small business 
enterprises that believe, perhaps rightly, that in an era of 
increasingly extreme, encompassing, and intense 
polarization,171 they may benefit by alienating perhaps even 90% 
of the broad possible customer base for the sake of greater 
loyalty from the remaining 10%.  Why not then obtain, and 
publicize, what may seem to some an officially endorsed 
trademarking of a crudely disparaging epithet? 
The protected free speech status of disparaging epithets, 
even where such disparagement is clearly intended, would seem 
to follow from the logic of the case of Matal v. Tam.172  The harms 
of such exposure could track those discussed above.173  And there 
would seem to be no technological guarantees against anyone’s 
involuntary exposure to such trademarks, or to news reports of 
their existence. 
These examples of the evidently increasing cultural costs of 
constitutionally protected speech certainly do not exhaust the 
field.  There are also arguable cultural costs that are admittedly 
more diffuse and contestable, but also subtler and pervasive.  
Consider today’s constitutional protection of commercial 
speech.174  Whatever the goals of restrictions on commercial 
marketing speech,175 there are always broader, but admittedly 
controversial, costs of commercial speech.  No doubt, rightly or 
 
Differently, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/06/how-
liberals-and-conservatives-shop-differently?autocomplete=true. 
170.  See sources cited supra note 169. 
171.  Consider the recent rise of the word “hathos” to describe the pleasure 
people might derive from their hatred of particular other people.  See, e.g., More 
On the Origins of Hathos, WORD PRESS (Dec. 22, 2008), 
https://thehathos.wordpress.com/2008/12/22/more-on-the-origins-of-hathos. 
172.  See 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
173.  See sources cited supra notes 151, 154–64. 
174.  See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (discussing current 
Supreme Court doctrine on the scope and protection of commercial speech).  In 
Sorrell, the Court applied some form of “heightened” scrutiny to strike down 
state statutory restrictions on “the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy 
records that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors.”  Id. at 557–
72. 
175.  Id. at 557–72.  
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wrongly, a “consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial 
speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent 
political dialogue.”176  But some speech-related cultural cost, of 
whatever magnitude, is involved in, for example, prescription 
drug marketing speech. 
As it turns out, the apparent competing speech of rival 
prescription drug sellers is also, more broadly, mutually 
reinforcing speech.  Competing advertisements may, jointly, 
lead many persons to act as though the best solution for their 
depression, anxiety, loneliness, and other ills lies in the 
consumption of prescription drugs.  In some cases, this 
commercial approach may indeed be best.  But in other cases, 
repairing damaged lifestyles and relationships would be more 
effective.  The free speech problem is that protected commercial 
advertising speech systematically prioritizes the former over the 
latter.177  Other speakers are certainly permitted to argue, on 
the contrary, for the importance for one’s health of lifestyles and 
relationships.  But in the marketplace of ideas, they will 
normally, and increasingly,178 be out-budgeted.179 
Again, one might dismiss or deny the cultural costs of 
protected commercial speech, but the broader case for the 
substantial and increasing cultural costs of protected speech in 
general remains.  As the benefits of protected speech in terms of 
the historically crucial free speech values decline, the cultural 
costs of free speech have generally tended to increase.  Freedom 
of speech, as normally understood, is itself substantially and 
increasingly an anachronistic remnant: a holdover from a 
previous culture, with only a diminished current justifiability. 
 
 
 
 
 
176.  Id. at 566 (quoting the attorney advertising case of Bates v. State 
Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)). 
177.  See generally R. George Wright, Freedom and Culture: Why We 
Should Not Buy Commercial Speech, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 137 (1994) 
(elaborating on this admittedly controversial argument). 
178.  For a sense of the remarkable estimated magnitudes, see Lindsey 
Tanner, US Medical Marketing Reaches $30 Billion, Drug Ads Top Surge, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.apnews.com/f44a7baa710d458ca50edd66affc1b91. 
179.  See id. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
In broad strokes, the traditionally cited free speech values 
of the pursuit of knowledge and truth, meaningful democratic 
self-government, and the promotion of genuine autonomy and 
self-realization have gradually evolved, in our culture, in ways 
that have reduced their meaningfulness and their power to 
justify constitutionally protecting speech generally at the 
expense of significant and more elemental values.  Other 
ongoing cultural trends, including those related to education, 
have further reduced the ability of freedom of speech generally 
to promote its historic basic values and purposes.  At the same 
time, some key cultural costs of freedom of speech have been 
correspondingly increasing. 
The case for a continuing elevated constitutional status for 
free speech in general has thus weakened over time.  The 
constitutional status of freedom of speech thus amounts, at this 
point, to a cultural holdover.  Those who view these 
developments as largely regrettable must come to terms with the 
persistence, and apparent stability, of most of the underlying 
cultural trends.  It is technically possible that these cultural 
trends could be reversed, in some cases, by an increased cultural 
emphasis on developing the most valuable versions of what we 
might call the basic epistemic180 virtues.181  Whether any such 
 
180.  The idea of epistemic virtues and epistemic vices reflects the view 
that there can be more and less effective ways of forming and testing and 
revising beliefs of all sorts.  See generally J. Turri, Virtue Epistemology, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue. 
181.  The Court’s classic free speech cases themselves sometimes suggest 
a vital role for widely recognized moral and particularly epistemic virtues.  See 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), 
(discussing “courage” as the “secret of liberty”), overruled in part by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 
95 (1940) (discussing “fearlessness”).  For a discussion of Justice Brandeis’ 
concurrence in Whitney, see Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal 
of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 653 (1988). 
  For classic expositions of the relevant widely accepted basic virtues, 
see ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Further 
revised ed. 2004) (~350 BCE) (discussing the virtues of courage, temperance or 
reasonable self-restraint, and prudential wisdom); THE BHAGAVAD-GITA, 
KRISHNA’S COUNSEL IN TIME OF WAR, THIRTEENTH TEACHING (Barbara Stoller 
Miller trans. 1986) (stating “knowledge means humility, sincerity, non-
violence, patience, honesty . . . purity, stability, self-restraint”).  Among 
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increased cultural emphasis on largely uncontroversial virtues 
is on the horizon is, for our present purposes, hereby entrusted 
to the judgment of the reader.  In the absence of any such 
developments, however, we will be increasingly likely, for 
increasingly evident reasons, to see broad constitutional 
freedom of speech as variously, “trivial, foreign, and 
unnecessarily costly,”182 as commonly involving something akin 
to secular “idolatry,”183 or as a legal practice subject to politicized 
“weaponization.”184 
 
 
contemporary writers, see ANDRÉ COMTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL TREATISE ON THE 
GREAT VIRTUES: THE USES OF PHILOSOPHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 31–59 (Catherine 
Temerson trans., 2001) (1996). 
  For useful contemporary discussions of the crucial epistemic virtues, 
see JASON BAEHR, THE INQUIRING MIND: ON INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES AND VIRTUE 
EPISTEMOLOGY (2013); CHRISTOPHER PETERSON & MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, 
CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND VIRTUES: A HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION (2004); 
ROBERT C. ROBERTS & W. JAY WOOD, INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES: AN ESSAY IN 
REGULATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY (2009); Heather Battaly, Closed-Mindedness and 
Dogmatism, 15 EPISTEME 261 (2018); Heather Battaly, Intellectual 
Perseverance, 14 J. MORAL PHIL. 669 (2017); Paul Bloomfield, Epistemic 
Temperance, 56 AM. PHIL. Q. 109 (2019); Dennis Whitcomb et al., Intellectual 
Humility: Owning Our Limitations, XCIV PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 
509 (2017); Michael D. Baumtrog, The Willingness to Be Rationally Persuaded, 
ONTARIO SOC’Y FOR THE STUDY OF ARGUMENTATION (2016), 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/71/. 
  For useful background on equality and inequality of persons’ relevant 
epistemic backgrounds in particular decisional contexts, see BRYAN FRANCES, 
DISAGREEMENT (2014); Bryan Frances & Jonathan Matheson, Disagreement, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disagreement; R. George Wright, Epistemic 
Peerhood in the Law, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663 (2017). 
  Finally, consider that some persons might argue today, whether 
rightly or wrongly, that a number of the above virtues classically thought to 
enhance the value of free discussion and debate are not worthy of cultivation 
by all persons, across the board. 
182.  For a different context, see Robert F. Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial 
Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 302, 340 (1984). 
183.  STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 
10 (2016).  
184.  See Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First 
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), 
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/first-amendment-conservatives-
supreme-court.html. 
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